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INSURANCE-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
ROBERT W. STURDIVANT*

LIABILITY INSURANCE
The case of Clinchfield R.R. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.' involved the question of whether the insured, in a suit against
his insurer, is bound by findings adverse to him in prior litigation
between the insured and a third person.
The liability insurance policy involved covered certain vehicles of
the railroad company but expressly excluded from coverage injuries
to employees in the course of their employment. One Harrison, a
regular railroad employee, was injured while riding in an insured
vehicle with a fellow employee. He sued the railroad company under
the Federal Employers Liability Act.2 Before he could recover under
this statute, of course, he had to establish that he was injured in the
course of his employment.
The railroad company notified the insurer of the suit, but the insurer declined to defend it on the ground that the employee's injury
was not covered by the policy. The railroad company thereupon defended the action, insisting that the employee was not in the course
of his employment when injured, but that he was on the way home
after completing the day's work. The jury found this controverted
issue against the employer and awarded damages to the plaintiff
Harrison.
To recover the amount of this judgment with interest and costs, the
railroad company brought the present suit against the insurer.
The district court held that the insured was bound by the adverse
decision in the previous case, and that it could not re-litigate the
issue. The court pointed out that an indemnitor is bound by the
decision of issues in suits to which the indemnitor is a party or of
which he has notice and declines to defend; and that the same rules
apply to an indemnitee. 3 Clearly if the jury had found that the plaintiff in the former action was not in the course of his employment
when injured, the insurer would have been precluded from ever
again litigating that issue; accordingly the insured was also held bound
by the decision under principles of judicial estoppel. The holding
seems proper and is in accord with other decisions in Tennessee deal4
ing with similar problems of estoppel by judgment.
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Trabue, Sturdivant &
Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 160 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
2. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
3. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §

107(e) (1942).

4. Caldwell v. Kelly, 302 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1957) (judgment in favor of
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The insured .also insisted in this case that the policy provisions
excluding coverage of injuries to employees were ambiguous, but
the court found no ambiguity in the contract. 5 Accordingly the
insurer was held not obligated to indemnify the railroad company for
the prior judgment, since the plaintiff in that case came within the
exclusions of the policy. ,
One case was reported during the survey period dealing with excess liability of an insurer for failure to settle a claim.6 Such liability,
of course, is established by proof that the insurer was guilty of bad
faith, not that it was merely negligent or imprudent; usually it is
necessary to prove that the insurer recklessly sacrificed the interests
of the insured to further its own interests.7 The resolution of such
cases frequently is left to a jury.
In the present case, the court *of appeals, by. a two-to-one decision,
affirmed a jury verdict against the insurer. The presiding justice dissented upon the ground that the evidence did not demonstrate bad
faith. The case involved an unusual automobile accident in which
the insured had driven upon some steps to a school building and had
injured two women who were entering the building. From the beginning the insured insisted that he had experienced a sudden and
unexpected mechanical brake failure, and he denied liability to the
injured persons. The attorneys for the insured accepted his version
of the accident. At the trial of the damage suit, however, the jury
had found the issues against the insured and had rendered a verdict
above the policy limits. The appellate courts had affirmed.8
In the present suit for the excess judgment, there was conflicting
testimony as to whether the cases could have been settled within the
policy limits and as to whether the insured had been kept properly
advised of the handling of the claims. The dissenting judge felt that
there was no evidence of mishandling of the damage suits, and his
master binding on plaintiff in action against servant); Cantrell v. Burnett &
Henderson Co., 187 Tenn. 552, 216 S.W.2d 307 (1948) (judgment in favor of
distributor for alleged defective product held binding on plaintiff in action
against manufacturer); cf. Wiles v. Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114 (1934)
(joint judgment against tortfeasors not determinative as to their relative fault
in later action for indemnity between them, since this issue not litigated in
prior suit).
5. The court declined to follow the suggestion in B. & H. Passmore Metal &
Roofing Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 147 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1945) that
a court should construe the phrase "engaged in the business" of an employer
liberally in favor of an employee claiming workmen's compensation, but
strictly against an insurer defending under an exclusion clause. Policy provisions excluding employees were deemed free from ambiguity in Patty v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 228 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1955) and Camp-

bell v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 238 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1956).
6. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 306 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1957).
7. See Sturdivant, Insurance-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 V.A='. L. RE '.
1068-71 (1953).

8. Hammonds v. Mansfield, 296 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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opinion is convincingly written. The majority, however, held that
from all of the circumstances connected with the investigation, settlement negotiations and trial of the negligence actions, a jury issue
was presented as to the good faith of the insurer.
The case adds little to the previously existing law on excess liability
in Tennessee. Primarily the issues were questions of fact. However,
liability is not nearly so clear as in some of the earlier cases. 9 The
dissenting judge viewed the decision as permitting a jury to secondguess a reputable and capable attorney in his handling of the intricate
and difficult questions which always arise in defending a damage
suit.
In the case of McMahon v. Baroness Erlanger Hospital,0 plaintiff
suffered personal injuries while she was a paying patient in a municipal hospital. The injuries were caused by alleged negligence of a
hospital employee. It appeared that the hospital was jointly operated
by funds from the city and county, and that it also received revenue
from paying patients, a tea room or restaurant, and vending machines
on the premises.
Both the trial court and court of appeals held that the hospital was
immune from tort liability, following a line of previous decisions in
the state which had held that such municipal institutions are immune.1 The fact that the institution had sources of revenue which
were incidental to its operation was held not to exempt the hospital
from immunity.
Both courts recognized that if the institution carried liability insurance to cover malpractice or negligence actions, then there would
be a waiver of immunity to the extent of such insurance. 12 In the
present case, the hospital board carried a "comprehensive" liability
policy on the hospital vehicles, and this policy also covered public
liability for accidents on the hospital elevators and grounds. It did
not expressly exclude coverage for malpractice, but the proof showed
that such coverage was not charged for in the premiums and had
apparently not been purchased. Although a "liberal" interpretation
of the policy could have resulted in a holding that there was coverage,
especially since by later amendment to the policy malpractice suits
were expressly excluded, nevertheless the court refused to construe
the contract to bind the insurer to a risk not contemplated either
by it or by the insured.
9. See, e.g., Vanderbilt University v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
109 F. Supp. 565 (M.D. Tenn. 1952), aff'd mem. 218 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1954).
10. 306 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).

11. Lane v. Knoxville, 170 Tenn. 482, 96 S.W.2d 769 (1936) (city hospital);
Wallwork v. Nashville, 147 Tenn. 681, 251 S.W. 755 (1922) (same).
12. McCloud v. LaFollette, 38 Tenn. App. 553, 276 S.W.2d 763 (E.S. 1954)
(city vehicle); Kingsport v. Lane, 35 Tenn. App. 183, 243 S.W.2d 285 (E.S.
1951) (insurance on city park).
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FIRE, THhFT AND COLLISION INSURANCE
A case of first impression in this state was Cherokee Insurance Co.
v. Hardin.13 The insurance company had issued a collision insurance
policy which contained the usual provision for cancellation and provided that the "mailing of notice" should be sufficient proof of notice
of cancellation. 14 Following a loss, suit was brought on the policy.
The company plead cancellation. The plaintiffs testified that they
never received the notice. The company produced from its files a
carbon of the purported notice to which was attached an official receipt of the post office at Nashville acknowledging receipt of mail for
transmission to plaintiff. The trial judge, recognizing that the requirement of the policy for cancellation was the mailing of notice, rather
than receipt by the assured, submitted an interrogatory to the jury as
to whether or not the notice was mailed. This, they answered in the
negative, and judgment was entered for the plaintiffs against the
company. The trial judge had declined to direct a verdict and his
action was affirmed by the court of appeals. However, the supreme
court reversed. The post office receipt was deemed critical. In the
ordinary situation while evidence of office routine and carbon with
confirmatory circumstances as to location of the carbon, etc., is sufficient to support a finding of mailing, it is also true that denial of
receipt or other proof raises a presumption that the letter was never
mailed. In such a situation a jury issue is presented. But, as in this
case, where there is unimpeached, uncontradicted, written official
acknowledgment of the post office that it received the letter for
transmission to the addressee, testimony of non-receipt alone is not
sufficient to permit an inference that the notice was not mailed.'5
In Palatine Insurance Co. v. E. K. Hardison Seed Co. 16 suit was
brought against the insurer upon a theft policy for loss of a truck.
The court of appeals held that the policy involved was a "valued
policy" rather than an open policy and that accordingly the insurance
company had no reasonable ground to insist upon an appraisal to
ascertain the actual value of the vehicle which had been stolen.'7 The
facts also disclosed that the company had rejected the proof of loss
13. 302 S.W.2d 817 (Tenn. 1957).
14. The policy provided: "The mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be
sufficient proof of notice and the effective date and hour of cancellation stated
in the notice shall become the end of the policy period." 302 S.W.2d at 818.
15. Accord, Wright v. Grain Dealers Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 186 F.2d 956
(4th Cir. 1950). Contra, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Taylor, 193 F.2d 756

(10th Cir. 1952) (applying Oklahoma law).

16. 303 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).

17. By endorsement several vehicles were covered by the policy. On the
truck involved the endorsement showed the cost and also the "amount of
insurance $1100." On the other covered vehicles neither of these items appeared and there was considerable premium differential. The court thought
this made it apparent that, as regards this vehicle, it was a valued policy.
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because the insured had failed to include certain information that was
already known to the company. 18 From these facts the court found
that there was ample evidence to support the jury's award of the
statutory penalty to the plaintiff. 19 It appeared that the trial judge
had directed a verdict in favor of the defendant as to the penalty at
the time of ruling on defendant's motion for a new trial. This action
of the judge was reversed, it being held that there was substantial
evidence of bad faith. There having been a jury verdict for the
penalty, the trial judge could have granted a new trial if he were not
satisfied therewith, but his discretion did not extend to directing a
verdict on this issue. The court of appeals, utilizing the statute permitting reinstatement of a verdict where there has been a remittitur,20
reinstated the penalty portion of the jury verdict. While, as the
court of appeals observed, the remittitur statute does not specifically
reach the situation presented, it would appear that reinstatement by
the court of appeals was certainly the logical and sensible procedure
in the premises.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE
In the case of T. H. Mastin & Co. v. Loveday,21 an injured employee
filed a workmen's compensation suit against the insurance carrier
for his employer without joining the employer as a defendant. The
accident for which he sought compensation occurred in Blount county,
where the employer had an office, but the petitioner lived in Sevier
county and filed his suit there. The insurer had no resident agent in
the state and was sued through process on the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking.22 The insurer filed a plea in abatement, insisting that proper venue was in Blount county.
Both the trial court and the supreme court held that the suit was
properly brought in the county where petitioner resided. It is not
necessary that the employer be made a defendant in compensation
cases.2 3 When the insurer has no resident agent, and process is served
18. Among the reasons assigned for rejecting the proof of loss was that
it did not contain the policy number or the name and address of the agent that

issued the policy.

19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105 (1956).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1956) which provides in part: "if, in the
opinion of said Court of Appeals, the verdict of the jury should not have been
reduced, but that the judgment of the trial court is correct in other respects,
the case shall be reversed to that extent, and judgment shall be rendered in
the Court of Appeals for the full amount originally awarded by the jury in
the trial court."
21. 308 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1957).
22. The Commissioner is expressly made a proper agent for service of
process for all foreign insurance companies doing business in the state. TENN.
CODE

23.

ANN. § 56-308 (1956).
TENN. CODE ANN. §

50-1209 (1956).
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on the Commissioner, the Commissioner is agent for the entire state.

Process can be served upon him from any county in the state.14
The result reached seems correct. It enables the petitioner to
maintain his action in the county of his residence when otherwise he
could not do so. The venue statute for compensation cases clearly

seems to permit suit in such county in all cases,2 5 but by judicial construction it is well settled that if the employer is sued, he cannot be

sued in the county of petitioner's residence unless he maintains an
26
office or agency there.

LIFE INSURANCE

Curfman v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America27 is an interesting
decision of first impression. While the contest was between the administrator of the deceased insured and a former wife of the insured
claiming under the "Facility of Payment Clause" of industrial policies,
with the company having interplead the claimants, the implications
of the holding should be of concern to insurance companies. The
insured's former wife testified that she had taken out the policies
and paid all of the premiums, and that when her husband was sentenced to prison, and again when she obtained a divorce, the agent
of the company assured her that if she continued to pay the premiums
that the proceeds would be paid to her; and that relying thereon, she
continued to pay until his death. There was no other testimony. No
beneficiary was named in the policies, and the proceeds were claimed
by the administrator. The chancellor held in his favor. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the representations of the agent
amounted to an election under the facility of payment clause, thereby
obligating the company to pay the proceeds to the former wife. While
it is generally recognized that the facility of payment clause is included for the benefit of the company and ordinarily affords no predicate for suit,28 it is also true that the company, having a right of
election, may make the election and be bound thereby. 29 Such election
is more frequently found in conduct after loss. In this case the election
is based upon representations of the agent before loss. In considering
24. Cartmell v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 498, 71 S.W.2d 688 (1934).
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1018 (1956).
26. Flowers v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 186 Tenn. 603, 212 S.W.2d 595
(1948); Brown v. Stone & Webster Engineering Co., 181 Tenn. 293, 181 S.W.2d
148 (1944).
27. 308 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
28. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chappell, 151 Tenn. 299, 269 S.W. 21 (1924);
Annot., 166 A.L.R. 10, 42 (1947).
29. Cawthon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 Tenn. 159, 93 S.W.2d 631
(1936). In this case, after death the company paid the widow the face amount
of the policy under the facility of payment clause. When she sued for double
indemnity the claim was made that she had no right to sue. The court held
that the company had elected to treat her as the beneficiary. See generally
2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AN PRACTIcE § 1168 (1941).
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the effect of the holding it must be remembered that in this case the
proceeds had not been paid out and the court was deciding between
the two claimants therefor. The equities were overwhelmingly with
the former wife. It cannot be concluded that the company would have
been held liable to her if it had already paid the proceeds to the administrator, yet the case does suggest caution in this area.

